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Introduction 
"Each year a large number of civilians are killed or injured by contact with unexploded munitions which no 
longer serve a military purpose. The presence of unexploded ordnance drains scarce medical resources 
in war-torn societies, prevents the delivery of food and medical supplies to vulnerable populations and 
hinders reconstruction and development." [1] 
In recent years, the negative humanitarian impact of some types of conventional weapons—landmines, 
for instance—has been well publicized and comprehensively regulated within several international 
treaties while other types of unexploded munitions, such as submunitions, have had a considerably lower 
profile. However, casualty data from international organizations involved in Kosovo indicate that 
unexploded sub-munitions cause more injuries or death than any other unexploded ordnance.[2] Since 
1980, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which 
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) has given arms 
control negotiators a comprehensive tool to reduce human suffering by prohibiting or restricting the use of 
certain conventional weapons.[3] Entered into force in 1983, the CCW includes three initial protocols, one 
amended and one additional protocol.[4] In addition, at the last Review Conference in 2001, States 
Parties to the Convention adopted an amendment to Article 1 of the Convention, which extended the 
Convention's scope to non-international conflicts.[5] By facing humanitarian threats caused by certain 
conventional weapons, the CCW has become an important part of international humanitarian law. 
Historical Background 
With every armed conflict, be it a tribal conflict, a royal battle between two provinces or just a simple 
demand of a powerful leader to become more powerful, rules of engagements were established not just 
to protect life but also to show a certain respect towards the enemy. During the European medieval times, 
for example, the knighthood contained within it several basic rules, which covered the protection of their 
own lives as well as the lives of others. This is why we still refer to the so-called "principle of chivalry."[6] 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau emphasized in his work, The Social Contract, that a war is not something 
between individuals, but between states, and one's status as an enemy is based just on a coincidence. 
The goal of these humanitarian rules of engagement was and still is the reduction of human suffering in 
an armed conflict. Rousseau's perspective provides the fundamental basis of today's international 
humanitarian law, that the physical destruction of an enemy may never be the goal of a military action.[7] 
International humanitarian law and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons has to be 
understood against the backdrop of these basic principles. 
After the Second World War, most interests regarding arms control were focused on weapons of mass 
destruction. But increasing concerns about the use of certain conventional weapons that caused 
excessive injuries or had indiscriminate effects,[8] especially during the Korean War and Vietnam War, 
led to the understanding that the use of these kinds of weapons should be regulated.[9] During that time, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) initiated activities regarding further developments of 
international humanitarian law.[10] In 1974, the first session of the International Conference on 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (CDDH) established 
an ad hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons, which convened two important Conferences of 
Governmental Experts in the following years to consider the prohibition or restriction of the use of certain 
conventional weapons, which may cause unnecessary suffering or may have indiscriminate effects.[11] 
As a result, the UN General Assembly decided in 1977 to convene a UN Conference on certain 
conventional weapons, which resulted in 1980 in the adoption of the framework convention, the CCW and 
its three Protocols.[12] 
Main Achievements of the CCW 
The CCW led to a practical implementation of several main principles of international humanitarian law. 
The convention specifies the basic rule that it is "prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material 
and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering."[13] This 
principle has often been misunderstood, or was viewed as being cynical, because of the fact that all war-
related suffering per se is unnecessary. But this rule states something else: some weapons or types of 
ammunitions may not be used because they cause suffering which is not necessary to achieve a certain 
military goal. That is to say, the goal can be achieved by using less cruel weapons. The death of a soldier 
is often not necessary to achieve the partial or complete submission of the enemy.[14] 
Another keystone is the attempt to balance humanitarian concerns and military necessities, the practical 
implementation of the so called rule of proportionality.[15] It often has been said that the CCW was a 
convention without teeth. Indeed, the final result of the 1980 UN Conference was sobering, and some 
observers felt that military considerations had carried more weight than humanitarian considerations.[16] 
In fact, there is a gap between the provisions and reality, especially where basic security interests are 
concerned. However, the CCW gives the international community a forum where all interested states can 
raise their relevant humanitarian and/or security concerns. In addition, the results are often practical and 
widely acceptable also to major military states. 
Facing New Challenges 
Bearing in mind that the CCW has been negotiated to be a dynamic treaty within which it would be 
possible to face new humanitarian challenges, very limited attention was given to the treaty during the 
1980s because of the absence of a compliance mechanism and its non-applicability to internal 
conflicts.[17] However, the last decade has shown some important developments. A new protocol on 
blinding lasers was adopted [18], Protocol II was amended [19], the process of universalization has been 
significantly revived [20]and the recent discussions about widely recognized humanitarian threats such as 
the issue of Explosive Remnants of War, have led to a new momentum.[21] In addition, with the 
amendment of Article 1 of the framework convention which extended its scope to non-international 
conflicts [22], the CCW community decided to face new challenges and to act in a responsible manner. 
However, more has to be done to promote the value and the importance of this convention. There are 
three main focus points which could lead the convention to a more successful future: 
• Universalization of the convention  
• Facing new humanitarian concerns  
• Strengthening the convention by implementing a practical compliance mechanism  
Universalization of the Convention 
To date, 91 countries have joined the CCW.[23] Many countries do not see the necessity of joining the 
CCW because of already being a States Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. However, the CCW covers a wide 
range of conventional weapons and provides a framework for regulating other types of weapons. Mines 
are not the only humanitarian challenge and the Mine Ban Treaty is a negotiated treaty which does not 
give scope for extending its goals. Accordingly, with the CCW, the international community has a tool to 
face new challenges and humanitarian concerns. In addition, the CCW is the only modern treaty that 
deals with conventional weapons and incorporates major military powers.[24]  
Therefore, it would be important that other countries adhere to the convention to strengthen this regime 
and further promote the value of the CCW. 
Facing new humanitarian concerns 
In recent years, a number of other conventional weapons and weapon systems have been considered as 
possible new elements for future protocols to the CCW. The main focus was Explosive Remnants of War, 
which resulted in a negotiating mandate for a new protocol at the 2002 Conference of States Parties.[25] 
But other proposals have also been considered; for example, mines other than anti-personnel landmines 
and small caliber ammunition have been on the agenda for several years. There is and always will be a 
gap between military technological developments and corresponding rules of international humanitarian 
law.[26] However by facing new humanitarian concerns without delay, the Convention remains a relevant 
part of the development of international humanitarian law. 
Strengthening the convention by implementing a practical compliance mechanism  
Recent proposals showed that there could be a way to strengthen the convention by adding a practical 
compliance mechanism either to the main convention or to each of the protocols.[27] It would not just 
increase the appeal of the CCW to countries still outside of the convention, it would encourage all current 
States Parties to fully comply with all provisions. 
Excursus: Explosive Remnants of War 
The problem of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) has become more and more alarming in recent 
years.[28] In particular, the rapidly expanding use of mass-produced cluster munitions, the increased 
reliance on highly sensitive micro-electronics in munitions and fuses, and quality-control problems in the 
highly competitive international arms market as well as budget pressures in the defense industry, have 
increased the likelihood that munitions malfunction during a conflict and continue to pose a serious threat 
to the civilian population and military personnel long after a conflict has ended.[29] According to recent 
statistics from the 1991 Gulf War and the 2000 Kosovo conflict, ERW killed and injured more military 
personnel after the end of the conflict than during the conflict.[30] Equally, ERW killed and injured more 
civilians in Kosovo than anti-personnel mines.[31] Such figures have raised public concern about the 
occurrence and rapid clearance of ERW in the context of post-conflict situations. ERW not only endanger 
the life of the civilian population but also impede post-conflict reconstruction efforts, including the 
repatriation of displaced civilians and refugees.[32] 
While the impact of landmines has been well publicized for many years, the enduring threat from ERW 
has had a considerably lower profile. Munitions clearance programs in dozens of countries now have to 
address the ERW issue, yet relatively little detailed technical information is available to assist them.[33] In 
recent years, concerns related to ERW have given rise to various international initiatives aimed at 
substantially reducing the occurrence of ERW after a conflict either by prohibiting certain types of 
munitions or by regulating their production, design and use. Such questions are currently being discussed 
in the wake of the CCW.  
At the CCW Review Conference in December 2001, a decision was made to discuss a possible way 
forward regarding ERW. The established Governmental Group of Experts gathered three times through 
2002 and at the Meeting of States Parties in December of the same year. It was decided that work should 
continue in the year 2003 with the following negotiating mandate[34]: 
• To negotiate an instrument on post-conflict remedial measures of a generic nature which would 
reduce the risks of ERW  
• To cover most types of explosive munitions, with the exception of mines  
• To consider questions regarding responsibility for clearance, existing ERW, the provision of 
information to facilitate clearance and risk education, warnings to civilian populations, assistance 
& co-operation, and a framework for regular consultations of High Contracting Parties  
This mandate allows States Parties to negotiate a new CCW protocol on ERW, which will be an important 
element of the fight against the immediate post-conflict threat posed by these unexploded ordnances.[35] 
However, this negotiating mandate does not cover possible preventive measures nor does it contemplate 
regulating the use of certain types of weapons that cause this threat [36]—which could be seen as 
weaknesses of the potential new protocol. The CCW is a convention which restricts or prohibits the use of 
certain conventional weapons. Explosive Remnants of War are the result of the use of some types of 
conventional weapons and are not weapons themselves. In the spirit of the CCW, new regulations should 
mainly be focused on preventive general and specific technical measures to effectively reduce the 
amount of explosive remnants. Any post-conflict regulation will be just a reaction which, from an overall 
standpoint, will not be enough to comprehensively solve the threat caused by ERW. 
In addition, the call for a total ban of certain types of conventional weapons that cause the ERW problem 
(e.g. submunitions) could be renewed if the protocol fails to provide a comprehensive solution. Attentive 
observers of how the Mine Ban Treaty became reality could see some comparable elements. After the 
first Review Conference of the CCW, no consensus was found for a total ban on anti-personnel mines. 
These fundamental frictions especially between military experts led to an independent process that 
resulted in the 1997 total ban of anti-personnel mines.[37] 
States Parties to the CCW have set out the general direction they want to pursue on the ERW issue. 
However, negotiations and discussions will reveal whether States Parties will in fact comprehensively 
deal with the problem caused by Explosive Remnants of War, or if there will be just a regulation for 
regulation's sake. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our WMD Resources  
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